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Rescaling Disability: The Construction  
of a European Social Group  
and Policy Arena 
Jay Rowell ∗ 
Abstract: »Behinderung redimensionieren: Die Konstruktion einer sozialen
Gruppe und eines politischen Felds in Europa«. Control over the production, 
the circulation and the use of statistical knowledge is inextricably linked to 
bu-reaucratic forms of domination. The historiography of the building of the 
mod-ern State insists on the tight relationship between the capacity to 
collect and utilise statistical knowledge and the consolidation of bureaucratic 
domination. The creation of statistical categories symbolically unifies 
territories, social groups and practices. Similarly, the European Union has 
invested heavily in harmonising statistical categories, thereby providing 
institutions and actors with uniform descriptive languages. However, unlike 
statistical constructs of the Nation States of the 18th and 19th Centuries, 
European statistical catego-ries are generated in a context of pre-existing 
statistical categories structuring public policies and social practice and 
institutions. The article will be empirical-ly based on the emergence of EU 
disability policy which managed to carve out a new arena for policy 
discussion and coordination form the 1990s on. Although this policy does 
not imply a transfer of sovereignty, the statistical unifi-cation of this social 
group at the European level and the structuring of interest groups and expert 
groups can be interpreted as an exercise of rescaling which has transformed 
the definition of disability as a policy problem and operated a shift in 
resources and legitimacies among stakeholders. Despite the successful
creation of a unified statistical category, the article will look into some reasons
for the limited use of disability statistics in policy making, but then show how
alliances put in place by the Commission with interest groups and expert circles
institutionalised a new European sector for policy discussion.
Keywords: Rescaling, EU politics, policy sector, disability, sociology of knowledge,
social policy.
1.  Introduction 
The European Union (EU), with its partial transfer of sovereignty, can be styl-
ised as an incremental, but far-reaching project of rescaling which transforms 
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national policy problems into common European problems requiring coordinat-
ed, if not common solutions. The legal principal of subsidiarity codifies the 
respective attributions of different levels of regulation implying a “natural” 
scale for the resolution of different types of policy problems. However, from a 
more sociological and constructivist perspective (Berger and Luckman 1966; 
Rowell and Mangenot 2010) it becomes clear that the existence of policy prob-
lems, the legitimacy of public regulation and the definition of the appropriate 
scale of their resolution depend on the mobilisation of policy entrepreneurs and 
the institutionalisation of common categories of observation and action (Penissat 
and Rowell 2015) which “make Europe” (Adler-Nissen and Kropp 2015). To 
better understand the rescaling of policy problems and target populations in the 
EU, we propose to take EU disability policy as an empirical example to identi-
fy the dynamics producing common categories, but also to point to the limits of 
an expert based process. 
Until the mid-1990s and the relaunch of “social Europe”, the EU had not 
developed specific policies in relationship to disability. From 1996 onwards 
disability became the focus of increasing activity giving rise to a process of insti-
tutionalisation seeking to impose the EU as a new arena for policy making and 
coordination. A specific mention of handicap was included in Article 13 of the 
Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997 on discrimination; a “High Level Group on Disa-
bility” comprised of national representatives was put into place; in 1997, the 
European Commission funded and supported a peak organisation regrouping 
disability interest groups, the European Disability Forum and a dedicated unit 
within the Directorate-General for Employment and Social Affairs (hereafter DG 
Empl) was set up. In the late 1990s policy entrepreneurs in DG Empl, disability 
interest groups and, more peripherally, MEPs and experts from academia and 
think tanks seized the window of opportunity of the effervescence on social 
policy to promote the EU as a legitimate forum for policy relating to disability 
and impose the social integration of the disabled as a European public problem 
(Smith 2004). 
1.1  Establishing a New Policy Arena in a Crowded Multi-Level 
Institutional Setting 
The establishment of a new space of policy discussion and coordination did not 
occur in a vacuum. The World Health Organisation had made disability a sig-
nificant issue since the 1970s and issued in 1981 the influential “social defini-
tion of handicap”1 which marked a demedicalisation of the identification and 
                                                             
1  In 1981 the WHO produced an influential integrated classification of disability by distin-
guishing between deficiencies, defined as a loss or an abnormality of a physiological, psy-
chological or anatomical function; incapacity defined somewhat tautologically as an inca-
pacitating limitation to accomplish activities considered to be normal for a human being 
 
HSR 42 (2017) 2  │  345 
treatment of disability. Likewise, the UN has been active in the definition of 
rights of people with disability since its creation and issued a charter on disabil-
ity rights in 2006. Even the economically oriented OECD has been active and 
has published a series of reports on jobs, education and health policies in their 
relation to disability (OECD 2003). However, the biggest challenge for the 
creation of a new policy arena at the European level was the variety of preexist-
ing definitions, linguistic categories (Barbier 2008), institutional arrangements 
and levels of policy implementation in EU member States. The rescaling of 
disability at the European level over the past twenty years therefore took place 
in a dynamic context in which the issue not only cut across a variety of policy 
sectors (health, education, employment, housing, urban planning, human rights, 
care, fiscal policy…) but was also effected simultaneously by a downscaling 
trend through the decentralisation of the provision of services to local or re-
gional governments, and a dynamic of upscaling through the activity of interna-
tional organisations (Priestly 2007). 
As in other social policy domains, EU member States have jealously guard-
ed ultimate sovereignty, but the emergence of an EU arena and the highly visi-
ble role of stakeholder groups have reconfigured networks of specialised actors 
and display the main features of multilevel governance (Hooghe and Marks 
2001). This includes a vertical intermeshing of policy fields facilitating the 
circulation of norms and categories and creating forms of interdependence 
necessary to the coordination of a variety of levels of government; the adjust-
ment of problem definitions and solutions to the appropriate level of their reso-
lution; the circulation of norms and resources; and the recasting of relationships 
between public actors and stakeholders. While the multilevel governance 
framework can be useful to conceptualise and to describe the imbrication of 
different levels of government, it has several blind spots which we would like 
to discuss in this article and confront with our case study. 
First, in this framework, the existence of multiple levels of government co-
operating in a given policy area is taken as a given, and does not first ask how 
new levels of government are carved out and successfully stake a claim on 
policy competencies where none had existed before. Governments and bureau-
cracies are structurally predisposed to defend their budgets and regulatory 
powers and so the ability of the EU to become a legitimate player in the field of 
disability cannot be taken for granted. Second, and in line with the first argu-
ment, different levels of government may be interdependent and may cooper-
ate, but there are constant struggles for power and legitimacy over the defini-
tion of the policy problem in a way most favourable to the institutional interests 
of each collective actor. This involves competition for authority and resources 
                                                                                                                                
resulting from a deficiency; and handicap as a social disadvantage resulting from an inca-
pacity hindering activities considered to be normal for a person of a determined age,  
gender, culture or social situation (ILO 1998, 16; CEC 2004, 24). 
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which often gravitate around the definition of problems, target populations, and 
solutions corresponding to the political and administrative goals and scales of 
intervention of each player (Schneider and Ingram 1993). Finally, the multi-
level governance framework implies a general agreement on the nature of the 
policy problem, its scale(s), and the appropriate courses of action. Again, the 
creation of a new European arena invites us to study multi-level policy sectors 
as arenas in which actors compete to impose their viewpoints, and thereby 
study processes of monopolisation of authority and the conditions of a success-
ful imposition of problem definitions (Georgakakis and Rowell 2013). 
1.2  A Constructivist Approach to Studying the Institutionalisation 
of New Scales of Action 
The relative success of EU Commission allied with Disability interest groups 
and experts in academia and consulting firms in carving out a policy space in a 
crowded institutional context therefore raises the question of resource mobilisa-
tion and problem framing (Snow et al. 1986). In many ways, the construction 
of the European polity can be usefully studied by drawing on literature on the 
role of knowledge management in the formation and consolidation of modern 
States (Desrosières 1998; Mespoulet 2008; Tooze 1996). The affirmation of a 
new center of administrative domination over a given territory requires a  
symbolic unification of the infinite diversity of situations, people, things and 
processes into homogeneous categories (Bourdieu 1993). In other words  
bureaucratic domination requires the translation of heterogeneous objects into 
homogenous categories, thereby making social dynamics less opaque and more 
predictable for government (Scott 1998) by embedding these categories into 
policy instruments (Lascoumes and Le Galès 2007). However, contrary to the 
dynamics of State building in the 18th and 19th centuries, EU actors seeking to 
promote a disability agenda were working in a context where member States 
had already constructed very resilient, but highly diverse categories. 
The first section of the paper will therefore provide a brief overview of the 
preexisting diversity of disability policy and the categorisation of the disabled 
in member States. The historical sedimentation of very heterogeneous policies 
and categories built into welfare schemes provided a serious challenge to the 
construction of European categories and problem definitions. However, from 
the late 1980s on, one can identify a convergence in preoccupations in member 
States around the rising costs of disability benefit payments and labour market 
decommodification which created the preconditions for an upscaling to the 
European level of a shared problem definition. It was precisely the claim that 
member States faced common problems, but implemented very different poli-
cies for widely differing outcomes that constituted the discursive lever used by 
policy entrepreneurs in the EU Commission to justify a European rescaling of 
the “problem” of disability. 
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We will subsequently examine the process of sifting and sorting of preexist-
ing policies which resulted in a problem definition focusing on employment. In 
other words, in the late 1990s, the problem definition was adapted to the 
emerging EU frame of employment as the flagship social policy signifying the 
exclusion or the subordination of a series of other policy objectives such as 
workplace safety, care, rehabilitation, poverty or housing. However, most im-
portantly, the legitimacy of the policy frame and the European scale depended 
on the marshaling of evidence (Baumgartner and Jones 2005) taking the shape 
of statistical indicators embedded in causal stories (Stone 1989) and the out-
sourcing of expertise to academics and consultancy firms. 
Finally, the European Commission did not just mobilise evidence to weigh 
both on internal battles and the opinions of stakeholders on the legitimacy and 
pertinence of the EU as a policy forum. It actively created and supported a 
coalition of allies in a relationship of mutual, if asymmetric interdependence 
with a network of academic experts, think tanks and interest groups. Thus, 
beyond the symbolic, legal and statistical unification of disabled Europeans, the 
institutionalisation of a European scale of public action also involved a deliber-
ate strategy to structure a social and institutional space of actors with a direct 
interest in promoting and relaying a European frame and scale of public action. 
2.  National Specificities and Common Problems: 
Justifying a Common Approach to Disability Policies 
The promotion of policies fostering the social integration of a vulnerable social 
group regarded as highly deserving of public solidarity (Van Oorschot 2006) 
appeared to be an attractive and consensual move to help humanise the image 
of the EU and demonstrate concern for the problems of ordinary citizens. As 
one high civil servant in DG Empl put it in an interview in 2007, “Who could 
possibly be against a policy to improve the lives of the disabled?” If there is a 
widespread consensus on the moral requirement for public action to support the 
disabled similar to the moral imperative to reduce traffic fatalities or fight 
cancer, disability is both a social and a policy category which has given rise to 
very diverse definitions and policies in member States. Therefore, beyond the 
general consensus on the deservingness of the disabled, the delivery of public 
action and even the definitions and perceptions of disability varied a great deal 
from one member State to another. 
2.1  Conceptions of Disability Embedded in National Histories and 
Social Policy Arrangements 
To begin, the semantic field of disability is highly fragmented both within 
nation states and between them despite the longstanding efforts of the United 
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Nations in diffusing legal definitions and the WHO in diffusing social or medi-
cal definitions (see note 1). In English, disability and handicap are two separate 
words united into one word in French and German.2 Associated terms of the 
semantic field such as deficiency, incapacity, invalidity, infirmity or chronic 
illness convey a variety of implicit significations depending on the origin of the 
condition (linked to an accident, working conditions, congenital, lifestyle, ill-
ness…), the type of physiological impairment and the possibility of reeducation, 
rehabilitation or other forms of support. The term therefore covers a deviation 
from a social norm which is more or less pronounced, visible or only detected 
through a medical diagnosis, but its meaning in ordinary categories of language 
and perception depends on cultural contexts and the history of social policy. 
The symbolic unification of the disabled and the institutionalisation of disa-
bility as a policy area was a gradual process linked to the development of social 
policies and the statistical apparatus (Kudlick 2003). For example, the US 
Census of 1888 produced a statistical and symbolic unification of the “defec-
tive classes” as a means to identify people with legitimate claims for govern-
ment protection and distinguish them from the able-bodied poor (Fujiura and 
Rutkowski-Kmitta 2005, 72). The rise of biopolitics theorised by Foucault 
brought with it the constitution of knowledge based on the recording, measur-
ing and comparing of populations around a statistical norm (Foucault 2003, 
243). A diversified set of institutions and procedures sought to ensure the 
health and well-being of the population and to inculcate values and discipline 
to produce a subject complying with the requirements of capitalism (self-
discipline, strength, independence, autonomy). 
This general trend in the capitalist societies of the 18th and 19th centuries 
was refracted in many different ways, as disability policy was built into the 
specific configurations of social policies. In the United States, the premise of a 
Federal social policy began around incapacitated Civil War veterans, widows 
and orphans at the local and State level (Skocpol 1992). In Germany and 
France, initial social insurance policies sought to cover workplace accidents 
generating a disability making it impossible for workers to gain their livelihood 
(Ewald 1986). Modern disability policies were therefore often first constructed 
around a limited, yet highly legitimate population such as mutilated war veterans, 
handicapped children or victims of workplace accidents, but gradually expanded 
both in terms of recognition of new health risks and in terms of the spillover into 
a variety of policy sectors of the post 1945 Welfare State (education, employ-
ment, health, transportation, urbanism…). 
                                                             
2  Henri-Jacques Stiker dates the semantic unification through the term handicap in France to 
the 1950s through a transfer from sports and betting terminology. Handicap condenses an 
anthropological conception of industrial capitalist societies which supposes the possibility 
to reeducate and rehabilitate the disabled, allowing them to enter the competition of the 
capitalist world by compensating for their disability (Stiker 2009). 
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The inscription of disability policy into social welfare systems generated a 
huge variety of programmes and measures. In some countries disability bene-
fits are based on contributory schemes of salaried workers, while in others, 
policies are funded through general tax revenues or through subsidies to private 
insurance schemes. Some countries have mandatory employment quotas for the 
disabled (with or without sanctions) while others don’t. Since the 1990s some 
countries such as the United States and the UK have focused on anti-
discrimination laws and jurisprudence. Levels of support varied greatly as did 
policies to promote mobility, education or public health. This diversity can be 
read through the list of the ministerial affiliations of the High Level Group on 
Disability set up by the European Commission in 1996 which included repre-
sentatives of the ministry of Justice (Ireland), Social Affairs (Italy, Denmark), 
the Family (Luxembourg), Health and Sports (Holland), Work, Health and Social 
Affairs (Austria), Work and Social Affairs (Germany), Health and Social Af-
fairs (Finland and Sweden), Education and Employment (UK) and so forth. 
Contrary to other collective and individual risks where the status of benefi-
ciaries of public solidarity are identified through a set of relatively consensual 
and parsimonious criteria such as age, revenue, maternity or social contributions, 
disability appears as a more open and indeterminate category (Zola 1993).  
Obtaining official recognition as a disabled person requires submitting oneself to 
a set of examinations and evaluations by official gatekeepers such as doctors, 
social workers or committees in a procedure which can be seen as stigmatising. 
This results in a situation in which in most national contexts a high percentage of 
eligible persons do not claim benefits they are entitled to. Conversely, about half 
of the disabled of working age in EU countries are active in the workplace. The 
category therefore has fuzzy borders with great discrepancies from one country to 
another as definitions, identification procedures and forms of public support 
vary widely, thereby making the “empirical verification of the existence of 
distinct social borders of the group targeted by public policy” (Schneider and 
Ingram 1993, 335) difficult to establish at the European level. 
2.2  The Cost of Disability: A Common Preoccupation of the 1990s 
Despite these variations in institutional arrangements and definitions, the 1990s 
were marked by a rising awareness in most countries of the spectacular increase 
in the number of beneficiaries on disability benefits and spiralling costs in a 
context where budget deficits and the financial sustainability of social welfare 
systems became important concerns in national and international political spaces. 
The number of workers on disability benefit increased by an average of 40% in 
OECD countries in the 1980s and 1990s (OECD 2003, 61). This rise can be 
linked to two dynamics. First, social mobilisations and developments in medical 
knowledge increased the number of “invisible” medical conditions justifying 
workplace decommodification: back pain, chronic muscular-skeletal pain, de-
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pression or other mental illnesses. Second, profound economic transformations 
linked to the sharp decline of manufacturing, increased outsourcing and structural 
unemployment exerted pressure to remove workers with health issues and skills 
in low demand from the labour market (Alcock et al. 2003). 
With unemployment being the central political issue in most European 
countries since the 1980s, the rapid expansion of disability benefits was initially 
considered a secondary issue until the 1990s brought stricter budgetary disci-
pline in the run-up to the Euro and rising awareness of costs or early retirement 
schemes and the shifting of unemployed workers onto disability benefit. In 
most countries, disability benefits cost more than unemployment benefits and 
in the UK, the numbers rose from 570.000 in 1981 to nearly 3 million in 1999, 
more than double the officially registered unemployed (Clasen et al. 2006, 
139). According to official statistics, Norway spent twelve times as much on 
disability as on unemployment benefits (Marin, Prinz and Queisser 2004, 20) 
and in the United States the number of beneficiaries rose by 43% in the 1990s 
despite a buoyant job market (OECD 2003, 61). 
As a result, throughout the 1990s, most European countries introduced a se-
ries of measures to restrict access to benefits through more rigorous medical 
screening, reduced, capped or means-testing benefits and the introduction of 
requirements to accept retraining and employment outside their profession. 
Holland, often cited as a model for reform by the EU was one of the first coun-
tries to reduce benefit payments in 1993, the oblige disabled workers to accept 
employment compatible with their condition in any profession (1993) and 
transfer disability insurance to employers or private insurance in 1996 (De Jong 
2004). In the UK, attempts to curb spiralling costs were introduced in 1996 
with measures to establish a clearer border between the “truly” disabled and the 
“disguised” unemployed. Despite these various reforms and a relatively buoy-
ant job market in the 1990s, the number of beneficiaries and expenditures con-
tinued to rise, while workplace participation stagnated or even declined in most 
countries (McVicar 2008; Burkhauser and Stapleton 2003, 10). The much 
studied and celebrated Dutch reforms managed to reduce public expenditure 
(from 4% of GDP in 1995 and 2.5% in 2005) but at the cost of reducing house-
hold incomes by 25% and with no effect on the number of registered disabled 
persons or employment levels (De Jong 2004, 182). 
By the mid-1990s, the budgetary cost of disability had become a subject of 
preoccupation in most member States, therefore providing the preconditions for 
the requalification of disability as a common European policy problem and 
generating increasing interest in national bureaucracies for policy reforms in 
neighbouring countries. Although the heterogeneity of policies, definitions and 
levels of spending were cast as an obstacle to EU harmonization, initial EU 
Commission policy documents insisted on the existence of a common European 
problem and placed emphasis on the heterogeneity of policy outcomes to justify 
policy harmonisation as a path to greater efficiency and a way to guarantee the 
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equal treatment of all (disabled) European citizens regardless of nationality. 
Rather than downplaying national differences, initial policy documents actually 
drew attention to the most stark differences, pointing out for example that the 
percentage of adults of working age on disability or long term illness benefits 
oscillated between 4% and 12% in member States, that the number of regis-
tered disabled persons varied between 4.6% in Italy and 29% in Austria, and 
that public expenditure varied between 0.7% et 4.6% of GDP (Eurostat 2001). 
If these figures raise enormous methodological problems, they provided powerful 
justifications for upscaling. However, the construction of a European arena for 
disability required the search for common ground in two areas: the first con-
sisted in identifying a set of common policy problems more politically palata-
ble than simply saving money; the second required the construction of common 
categories of observation and action to set policy objectives and compare and 
evaluate outcomes. 
3.  Sifting, Sorting and Rescaling Categories of 
Observation and Action 
The first official EU publication on the subject was the 1996 report of the 
“High Level Group” of national representatives whose objective was to “re-
view current developments in existing policies in member States and bring 
together information and experience” (CEC 1996, 1). This document was a first 
step in the process of sorting through the myriad of existing policies at the 
national level to identify common ground for cooperation at the European 
scale. The document identifies five “spheres of exclusion” in which “a signifi-
cant number of [disabled] citizens don’t have the same access to rights and 
opportunities as the majority of citizens”: education, employment, mobility, 
housing and poverty (CEC 1996, 2-3). This first document is interesting in 
several ways. First, it reflects the fact that disability is inscribed into a number 
of policy sectors and ministries. Second, the question of health and the preven-
tion of long-term illness remained outside of the scope of the report, which is a 
surprise at first glance given that the history of disability and its definitions 
were for many decades dominated by medical knowledge and a rehabilitation 
and prevention frame in most countries. Third, the theme of discrimination and 
legal approaches are absent from the document, even if Ireland and the UK had 
recently voted anti-discrimination legislation modelled on the Americans with 
the Disabilities Act of 1990. Finally, even if employment figures in the docu-
ment, it is far from occupying the central place that it would subsequently hold. 
How was it then that within two years, European disability policy would be-
come nearly synonymous with employment policy to the near total exclusion of 
the four other “spheres of exclusion” identified in 1996? 
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3.1  The Centrality of the EU Commission as a Policy Entrepreneur 
To understand this process, it is important to highlight that the High Level 
Group directly met infrequently and was marked by a turnover of the members 
delegated to the meetings by their national ministries (Interview civil servant, 
DG Empl, December 12, 2008). Between meetings, the civil servants of DG 
Employment played a decisive role in setting the agenda for the meetings, 
drafting documents and independently publishing a series of working papers 
and documents which became increasingly focused on employment, a policy 
which was taking shape as the flagship policy for the renewal of EU social 
policy from 1996 onwards. In successive documents produced by Commission 
civil servants identifying key problems and sketching out the contours of a 
desirable European policy model, the themes of health, education, housing or 
poverty were progressively marginalised. Economic integration of the disabled 
was seen as the cornerstone to solving all other difficulties affecting their lives 
(SEC 1998, 1). The shared problem identified was therefore not poverty, dis-
crimination or insufficient access to social services, but low labour market 
participation generating poverty and social exclusion. A 1998 staff working 
paper identified the Commission as the most adequate coordinating actor to im-
prove well-meaning, but misguided, national policies through a change of scale. 
Given the scale of the problem and the effort required, member States have 
become aware of the necessity to rethink action in this policy sector. The 
problem of the multiple barriers that confront disabled people on the employ-
ment market demonstrates the necessity to adopt a global response to meet the 
challenges. Member States wish to increase activity rates of disabled people 
by encouraging them to move from welfare to work by eliminating the many 
obstacles to their full participation. (SEC 1998, 2) 
The policy papers produced by DG Employment between 1997 and 2000 grad-
ually transform the means (employment) to achieving social inclusion into the 
sole policy objective and a lever to encourage far-reaching reforms of welfare 
provision in member States. In doing so, the Commission positioned itself as 
the champions of the interests of European disabled persons but also of the 
overarching interests of member States: 
In addition to a particularly low rate of employment, member States indicate 
that a majority of disabled persons of working age are far removed from the 
labour market and highly dependent on benefits. These benefits often rein-
force market exclusion by creating an inactivity trap […] [the situation can be 
improved by] moving to a culture of work and fighting the culture of depend-
ency by removing the barriers to full social participation […] and rethinking 
and reforming benefits systems. (CEC 1997, 2) 
Commission documents harness the image of the disabled produced by Euro-
pean interest groups such as the European Disability Forum or Workability 
Europe insisting on abilities rather than handicap by implicitly assuming that 
all disabled persons were capable of productive work given the proper support 
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and incentives. Existing “passive” policy measures such as benefits were por-
trayed as well-meaning, but inefficient and even counterproductive by stigmatis-
ing, creating disincentives and promoting a “culture of dependency.” A 1998 DG 
Employment working paper pleaded in favour of “a common frame of reference 
for future action by member States to reach the targets of their employment strat-
egies including the improvement of employment opportunities for people with 
disability” (SEC 1998, 1). For the next ten years, the Commission would con-
stantly repeat the same message around the necessity to replace policies which 
“compensate a state of social exclusion” with “measures that promote social and 
economic integration” (CEC 1997, 11). What was missing was empirical evi-
dence on the scope of the problem and the identification of “best practice” 
which could be generalised as the basis for a common European policy. 
3.2  Marshalling Evidence: The Statistical Construction of a 
European Social Group 
Largely insulated from electoral pressures, the internal working of the EU 
commission places a premium on apolitical forms of interaction largely based 
on a transformation of political issues into questions mobilising expertise. The 
challenge thus facing policy entrepreneurs in DG Empl was conforming to the 
imperative of “evidence based policy making” largely based on quantitative 
reasoning. As a result, DG Empl, via Eurostat, invested heavily in refining the 
statistical apparatus measuring disability and its relationship to labour market 
participation. The underlying objective was to identify countries with the best 
performance in order to establish causal links between outcomes and policies 
as a means to identify best practice that could in turn serve policy convergence. 
However, the task of quantifying a group as heterogeneous as the disabled 
proved to be daunting. Already a difficult problem at the national level due to 
the fluid boundaries between the “able bodied” and the disabled, the problem 
was compounded at the European level by incommensurable national statistical 
categories. Given this extreme disparity of national administrative registers, the 
decision was taken to include or refine indicators on impairment in two flag-
ship Eurostat surveys: the Labour Force Survey (LFS) and the EU Survey on 
Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC). 
While the phrasing of the question varied slightly, both surveys sought to 
measure impairment and its effects by first asking respondents if they had 
experienced a chronic medical condition over the past 6 months, then went on 
to ask if this condition hindered them in the accomplishment of a series of daily 
activities (in the case of EU-SILC), or the type or quantity of work (in the case 
of the LFS). While the phrasing of the question in the EU-SILC and the inclu-
sion of all age groups produced a higher overall estimation of disabled persons 
in Europe, the Commission chose the figures from the LFS (limited to persons 
of working age) in policy documents and statistical analysis. The number gen-
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erated by LFS was nonetheless dramatic and became the starting point of all 
policy documents of the EU as well as European interest groups: 44.6 million 
Europeans were presented as disabled in 2002 (16% of the EU population), a 
number which jumped to 80 million following EU enlargement and definitional 
changes. While the choice of LFS was in part dictated by the revision of EU-
SILC at the beginning of the 2000s which did not allow the  disability module 
to be  included in all national surveys, LFS was better equipped to produce 
statistics on the central aim of policy: employment. This facilitated the produc-
tion of statistical knowledge on labour force participation, educational levels, 
age and gender, but simultaneously created several important blind spots which 
the use of EU-SILC would have brought into view. First, by focusing on the 
working-age population, forms of impairment linked to ageing and affecting 
children were invisible. Second, contrary to EU-SILC, the LFS did not measure 
income levels, sources of income, poverty or housing conditions which were 
outside the policy frame, but which could be construed as essential to the meas-
urement of social inclusion. Finally, LFS did not go into any detail on the origins 
of the impairment (congenital, chronic illness, accident, etc.) or the type of im-
pairment (mental, sensorial, muscular-skeletal, cardio-vascular, etc.). The produc-
tion of a single number of disabled Europeans symbolically united a new Europe-
an social category harnessing the social and political authority of numbers. By 
grouping together individuals of different nationalities suffering from a very wide 
range of impairments and with very different perceptions of incapacity (over a 
third of self-declared sufferers of a chronic illness reported no limitations in the 
amount or type of work they could accomplish), the statistical construction of the 
disabled was abstract, decontextualised, and in many ways a-sociological. While 
this was not a problem in communicating to the general public, statistics on 
disability and labour participation failed to provide convincing evidence for 
robust policy making. 
3.3  The Fragility of Survey Based Statistical Knowledge 
When compared to beliefs in macroeconomic data or microeconomic modelling, 
beliefs in the ability of social statistics to accurately measure reality are ham-
pered by a series of structural obstacles. Contrary to macroeconomic indicators 
they have not been the object of decades of standardisation and widespread use. 
In addition, they often rely on survey research based on (subjective) self-
declaration rather than supposedly more objective reporting from administra-
tions or economic actors. EU civil servants specialised in employment are most 
often trained economists and so naturally question the credibility of data “based 
on some sort of subjective self-declaration” (Interview Unit head, DG Empl, 
April 18, 2008). In addition, the overall figure of 16% of the working age popula-
tion masked huge national discrepancies between national samples despite the 
care taken in the translation and formulation of questions. The distribution around 
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the European average of 16% ranged from 6% to 32%, a difference which could 
not be explained through demographic or public health differences (Ward and 
Grammenos 2007, 20). In other words, standardised survey data which sought to 
get around the problems of incommensurable national administrative records 
continued to reflect cultural and linguistic differences with regard to health 
norms, acceptance of disability or social stigma attached to incapacity, thereby 
weakening beliefs that they “objectively” measured disability. 
Furthermore, no clear patterns emerged from data analysis linking positive 
employment outcomes to the types of “active” policies promoted by the Com-
mission. Following the issuing in 2001 of the Lisbon target seeking to bring 
activity levels in the EU from 62% to 70% by 2010, statistical analysis and 
benchmarking on labour participation rates allowed for the identification of “tar-
gets for activation”: women, workers between 55 and 64, young workers, and the 
disabled. Disabled workers were designated as a “labour reserve” and an “inex-
ploited potential for activation” (CEC 2006, 73). LFS data was harnessed to 
justify claims that increased activity rates would not only be key to promoting 
social inclusion, but that active policy targeted to the disabled would contribute to 
economic growth, reduce public expenditures and make a significant contribution 
to the overall Lisbon labour market targets (CEC 2005, 2-3). A 2002 DG Empl 
document went even so far as strive to “bring the percentage of disabled persons 
in work to the same level as the non-disabled by 2010” (CEC 2002, 7). This goal 
meant reversing, in a short time span, a structural problem (LFS estimated that 
42% of disabled Europeans aged 16-64 were working) for a population that 
was on average older, less educated and suffering from health problems. 
While most publically available Commission documents generally avoided 
providing quantified targets, one staff working paper and two papers commis-
sioned to external experts identify a potential for “activation” at between 3 and 
8 million Europeans. Interviews with personnel from Directorate-General Eco-
nomic and Financial Affairs (hereafter DG ECFIN) indeed demonstrate that 
DG Empl officials made claims of this sort in internal discussions in an attempt 
to draw more attention and resources to disability: 
Any contribution to increasing activity rates is useful. If this comes from 
women, older workers, the disabled, it doesn’t really matter. All that is posi-
tive, of course. But my feeling is, and this is my personal opinion, that they 
[DG Empl] had a tendency to go overboard, to say that the disabled could 
make a huge contribution… they were talking millions. Yes, they can contrib-
ute, but realistically, the disabled are not the biggest source of underutilisation 
of labour in Europe. So they had a tendency, according to me, to weaken their 
position by exaggerating too much. This type of argument can actually end up 
being self-defeating. (Interview Unit head, DG Ecfin, December 10, 2007) 
An analysis of LFS data by a consulting firm in 2007 indeed demonstrated that 
people declaring a chronic health condition, but stating that the condition did 
not significantly limit the type or quantity of work they could perform actually 
had higher activity rates than people declaring no disability. It is only among 
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respondents declaring important effects on the quantity or type of work they 
could do (about a third of those declaring an impairment) that the “activity” 
gap became extremely significant (Grammanos and Ward 2007). Just as puz-
zling to Commission civil servants, the countries which were most often men-
tioned in interviews and singled out in policy papers for their “active” and 
innovative policies (Denmark, UK, Holland) actually performed quite poorly in 
terms of activity rates (both as percentages of those declaring a medical condi-
tion and in absolute terms), while countries with stigmatized “passive” policies 
or protected and highly subsidised employment schemes such as France or 
Germany actually had better outcomes. If the civil servants interviewed from 
DG Empl seemed unaware of this data, failed to grasp its meaning, or appeared 
to have made little use of the six lengthy reports commissioned between 2000 
and 2004,3 civil servants from DG Ecfin probably had a more realistic and 
informed vision, allowing them to claim the high ground on an issue which was 
theoretically the “property” of DG Empl: 
The economic argument they made is a double edged sword. If one makes a 
close analysis of all the available data on active labour market policies, if one 
really takes a close look at the economic or fiscal bottom line, it is sometimes 
better to just pay people to stay at home rather than to throw vast resources at 
the problem with a very limited result. (Interview Unit head, DG Ecfin, April 
16, 2008) 
DG Empl lost the internal battle of bureaucratic authority on control over em-
ployment policies around 2005 (Erhel 2011) and the framing of disability as a 
problem of work lost steam due to uncertainties over its measurement and 
when it became clear that the disabled were the only target group for “activa-
tion” where labour market participation was actually declining. By the late 
2000s, policy objectives shifted to more traditional Community methods, in 
particular with anti-discrimination legislation. The Disability unit itself was trans-
ferred from DG Empl to DG Justice in 2011. The statistical apparatus continues 
to churn out data, and documents published by the Commission and interest 
groups continue to highlight the numbers of disabled Europeans, but the shift to a 
rights-based strategy means that statistical data is hardly used to formulate or 
justify European disability policy. The following question then arises: What was 
the purpose of the dozens of costly studies and reports and the statistical data so 
painstakingly gathered and analysed by consultants and academic experts? 
                                                             
3  We constructed a data set of 71 non-medical research projects funded by the EU between 
1992 and 2012 and compiled a data base of 234 EU disability experts which also included 
the Academic Network of European Disability experts. In interviews with four members of 
the Disability unit in the late 2000s, none of this research was spontaneously cited as a re-
source for formulating policy. When directly asked which outside experts played a role, one 
economics professor was named. This professor based in Brussels was a personal relation of 
the civil servant questioned but was not among the 234 officially funded or recognised ex-
perts in the data set. 
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4.  Creating a European Policy Community 
Despite an employment approach to disability which failed to produce any 
tangible results, the policy area has survived as a European issue with its own 
administrative unit providing funding for research and social programs. The 
Commission continues to produce a steady stream of policy papers, “action 
plans” and “strategies.” To understand the survival of a policy area despite the 
failure of the policy it promoted, one can make the hypothesis that it was the 
ability of the Disability unit to structure a space of actors specialised in EU 
disability policy which produced lock-in effects making it possible for a policy 
community to outlive the policy it had promoted for a decade. Gravitating 
around the Commission one indeed finds two types of allied actors: academics 
and experts in consulting firms and think tanks on the one hand and federations 
of European disability interest groups on the other. 
Recent research on the relationships between EU institutions and European 
studies (Rosamond 2015), legal studies (Vauchez and De Witte 2013), economics 
(Mudge and Vauchez 2012) or public opinion research (Aldrin 2011) have 
drawn attention to the solid structuring of European subfields based on recipro-
cal exchanges of resources, expertise and legitimacies (Robert 2012). It has 
also been noted that the creation of new European policies or administrative 
transformations reconfigure the structure of European interest groups (Courty 
and Michel 2013). These transactions forge a convergence of interests and 
representations further cemented by the circulation of actors between the 
Commission, academia, think tanks and interest groups or their multipositional-
ity (Michel and Robert 2010). 
4.1  Creating European Interest Groups from Scratch 
Until 1996, EU disability policy was primarily administered through structural 
or social funds. The Commission funded local initiatives involving disability 
associations and private partners in areas such as improving the accessibility of 
public infrastructure, developing assistive technologies, training social workers 
or identifying best practice. In the run-up to the Amsterdam Treaty and the 
lobbying for the inclusion of the disabled in Article 13 on Equality and free-
dom from discrimination, DG Employment began to dedicate resources to 
encourage the emergence of European interest groups and peak organisations in 
the field of disability. Most European interest groups were indeed founded after 
1996: European Disability Forum (1996), the largest in the field with a perma-
nent staff of 10-15, got about 80% of its funding from the Commission 
(Granick 2010), the European Association of Service Providers for Persons 
with Disabilities (EASPD) founded in 1996, the European platform for rehabil-
itation (2001), Mental Health Europe, Inclusion Europe, or Workability Europe 
(2001), to name the most active groups. 
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In this configuration, the European Disability Forum (EDF) played a central 
role as peak organisation. The successive directors played a key role in public 
events organised by the Commission on the topic and often shared the floor dur-
ing the most visible events alongside the EU Commissioner or Disability unit 
head. The first director of EDF, Nicola Bedlington, had worked in the 1990s as a 
contractual agent of the Commission in charge of outreach programmes to na-
tional disability associations, before heading the European Deaf Forum, one of 
the founding members of EDF, and then moving on to direct EDF at its inception 
in 1996.4 Another former director, Carlotta Bezozzi, holds a Masters in political 
science and international relations, was a parliamentary assistant at the European 
parliament between 1995 and 2000, then became policy officer at EDF in 2000 
and director in 2004. 
In the division of labour between the European interest groups, EDF with its 
5 to 7 policy officers, maintains close contacts with relevant Commission offi-
cials, while the smaller federations, often with only one or two policy officers 
(who may be shared between two separate associations, who also often share 
office space), are only convened to discussions on more specific issues: the ser-
vice directive for EASPD; mental health issues for Mental Health Europe, and so 
forth. The input of interest group representatives primarily consists in identifying 
potential obstacles to implementation in national settings on a proposed Commis-
sion measure. Their usefulness to the Commission therefore lies in their ability to 
gather information from a diversity of sectors and social contexts and to “trans-
late, reformulate and illustrate potential problems which we can bring to the 
attention of the Commission” (Interview policy officer, European Platform for 
Rehabilitation, Brussels, May 4, 2009). This flow of information creates vertical 
linkages between European federations and national associations, but most verti-
cal information exchanges consist in identifying and circulating “best practice” 
and in supporting national associations in obtaining European project funding 
(Interviews policy officers, EASPD and Workability Europe, May 7, 2009). 
The proximity of Commission officials to European interest group repre-
sentatives based on a circulation of personnel, subsidies, and reciprocal flows 
of information have generated a close relationship between the Commission 
and policy officers. European interest group professionals are often young 
holders of Masters in European studies who have had no prior experience in 
national associations or ties to activism. They are sociologically close to Com-
mission officials, share a technical, denationalised and depoliticised style, 
                                                             
4  Nicola Bedlington holds a BA in management from the University of Manchester. After a 
brief period of employment at the Centre for Disability Studies at Leeds University which 
was central in establishing the field of Disability studies in Europe, Bedlington engaged in a 
European career and currently heads the European Patients Forum. Her homepage mentions 
her role as expert for the EU commission and her role as coordinator of an OECD network of 
experts on education and sustainable development. 
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which can create frictions with representatives of national associations with a 
background in activism (Interview policy officer, EDF, May 9, 2010). This 
dynamic, observable in other similar fields such as trade unions (Wagner 
2013), tends to autonomise a European space of policy deliberation and distend 
links between interest group principals and their agents in Brussels. With re-
gard to the labour activation frame, proximity between the Commission per-
sonnel and European interest professionals provided symbolic support, but did 
little to strengthen the hand of DG Empl in its struggle with DG Ecfin. First, 
DG Empl was always suspected of being “captive of their clientele,” to use a 
recurrent expression used by interviewed DG Ecfin officials when referring to 
their counterparts of DG Empl. Second, none of the interest group policy offic-
ers active in disability had a background in economics or quantitative social 
sciences. Their activities remained mainly cast in legal terms and centred on 
the legal obstacles of proposed measures in national settings, rather than 
knowledge production or analysis which could have been potentially useful in 
evaluating the impact of policy on activity rates. This type of discussion re-
mained part of exchanges with national governments in the framework of the 
national employment strategies (NEP), but disability played a very marginal 
role in these reports and the production of the NEPs remained largely confined 
to ministerial bureaucracies. Interest group representatives therefore did little to 
relay knowledge claims, statistical data or EU policy recommendations towards 
their constituents, thereby hindering a wider social diffusion of the employment 
frame and objectives. The anti-discrimination frame adopted in the late 2000s 
was in the end both more in phase with legal approaches of advocacy groups 
and with the skills of European interest group professionals. 
4.2  Institutionalising Disability Expertise 
As demonstrated above, expertise outsourced to academics and consultancy 
firms had little resonance within DG Empl. One could have expected increased 
recourse to outside expertise in times of uncertainty, for example in the late 
1990s in the search for tools to identify problem areas or to evaluate best prac-
tice or in the late 2000s to research the effects of anti-discrimination legislation 
in national settings, but we actually find just the opposite. The recourse to 
expertise funded by the Commission occurred after the officialisation of policy 
frames. Using the EU Cordis tool, we created a data base of 71 funded projects 
on disability (excluding strictly medical research) covering the period 1992 to 
2012 and could establish that research on employment was only funded after 
2000. Similarly, the first research contract on comparative legal approaches 
was commissioned in 2010, when the anti-discrimination frame was already 
firmly established. While the tendering of research undoubtedly helped to flesh 
out, operationalise, and legitimise policy preferences, we would like to insist 
here on the transactions which bound academic and non-academic experts to 
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the Commission, both sociologically and symbolically, and thereby contributed 
to reinforcing and broadening the field of actors with a direct interest in sup-
porting a European scale of action on disability. 
Academic publications comparing disability policy or law in European 
countries or taking EU disability policies as an object are marginal in Disability 
studies or their respective academic disciplines (primarily sociology, political 
science, and epidemiology). Significantly, the timing and intensity of scientific 
publications on these issues closely followed the institutional agenda of the EU 
and were clearly stimulated by European research funding. The leading authors 
of comparative and European disability studies have nearly without exception 
participated in research projects funded by the EU and participate in the net-
work of experts set up by the EU (ANED) from 2007 onwards. The emergence 
of a subfield within disability studies with a comparative and European per-
spective, with its own scientific journal founded in 2007 (ALTER – European 
Journal of Disability Studies published by Elsevier) undoubtedly contributes to 
legitimate the existence of Europe as a scale of discussion on disability policy 
and outcomes. Academics active in this field were also in many cases “national 
experts” for the OCDE or the WHO or even worked for the OCDE during part 
of their career. 
While academics publishing on European or comparative policies and dou-
bling as experts all have distinguished careers, they are not the most recognised 
or quoted scholars in the field of Disability studies or in their discipline. The most 
central academics in this field, who were often at the forefront of the institutional-
isation of Disability studies in the 1980s, combined academic and militant in-
vestments by promoting a radical constructivist scientific agenda, which was 
undoubtedly foreign to the more pragmatic needs of Commission officials less 
interested in a Foucauldian critique of the category itself, than applied research 
which could be mustered in identifying best practice and policy convergence. 
At the end of 2007, the Commission funded and set up a permanent network 
of disability experts to replace the ad hoc tendering of reports, research and 
expertise. This corresponded with the shift towards a more legal based ap-
proach, reflected both by the profiles of the research themes and the academic 
profiles of the lead scholars. While the emphasis was placed on academic exper-
tise, the European Disability Forum played a central role as did Human European 
Consultancy and the Centre for Disability Studies of Leeds University. 
The careers of the leading figures of ANED of the 2010s demonstrate the 
importance of multipositioning in academia and European expertise. The lead 
academic of ANED, Mark Priestley, became director of ANED at age 44, just a 
year after obtaining a professorship and being named director of the Leeds 
Centre which played a leading role in the institutionalisation of Disability stud-
ies in the UK and Europe in the 1980s and 1990s. Author of three books, he 
publishes regularly, but his publications are limited to disability journals and 
not the most central journals of his discipline. As director of the Leeds Centre, 
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he commands a significant research potential and international research net-
works and has a long track record of being an expert. Lisa Waddington and 
Anna Lawson, both legal scolars who took on responsabilities in ANED in the 
late 2000s present similar profiles, but with more international career paths 
(PhD University Institute of Florence for Waddington5). A fourth central fig-
ure, the legal scholar Gerard Quinn, of the University of Galway, has a career 
more centrally focused on expertise: holder of a degree from Harvard Law 
School, Quinn had worked for a time for the European Commission and spe-
cialised in comparative law. With few academic publications, Quinn nonethe-
less multiplied institutional positions of expertise at the national level (Irish 
Human Rights Commission), in European arenas (ANED, Vice president of the 
European Committee for Social Rights – Council of Europe), international 
venues (member of the working group drafting the UN Charter on rights for 
people with disabilities), and private actors (expert for no less than seven pri-
vate foundations or interest groups). The last two lead scholars of ANED, Jean-
François Ravaud and Anne Waldschmidt, reflect a more pure academic and 
national profile, as they are leading figures in their national fields, and publish 
in prestigious journals of their discipline outside of disability studies, but are 
less active in international expert circles.6 These profiles, and other profiles of 
experts active in ANED which include Stephano Grammenos, an economist 
working for the Centre for European Social and Economic Policy, a European 
policy think tank, demonstrate that recognition as an expert is not purely based 
on academic credentials, but depends on institutional positions and a dense 
network of connections to interest groups and consultancy firms. These proper-
ties provide the Commission with guarantees in the capacity of academic ex-
perts to produce pragmatic, policy oriented recommendations detached from 
purely academic debates. The hybridisation of academic, expert and bureau-
cratic logics is visible through the individual biographies, but also through the 
organisation of ANED itself which closely associates EDF policy officers in 
the drafting of reports and the institutional knowhow of Human European 
Consultancy, a Dutch based firm, whose expertise closely followed the political 
preoccupations of the Commission in the field of social policy over more than 
two decades.7 
                                                             
5  Lisa Wadington is holder of a professorship at the University of Maastricht funded by EDF, 
which receives in turn the lion’s share of its funding from the Commission. Her thesis, defend-
ed in 1993 was entitled: “More Disabled Than Others. The Employment of Disabled People 
within the European Community: An Analysis of Existing Measures and Proposals for Reform.” 
6  Jean-François Ravaud has directed since 2007 the research federation that hosts ALTER- 
European Journal for Disability Research whose chief editor was for several years Henri-
Jacques Stiker, one of the leading figures in Disability studies in Europe. 
7  Founded in 1986 by trade unionists of the Dutch public sector, the firm obtained its first 
European contract in 1992 on social policies in Hungary before going on to specialise in 
policy expertise in social and health policies in central Europe. At the end of the 1990s the 
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5.  Conclusion 
Over a decade, attempts by the EU to coax member States into focusing disability 
policies on labour market participation by promoting “active” policies based on 
statistical evidence appear to have largely failed. Similarly, the strategy based 
on a general and far reaching directive on discrimination which includes the 
disabled among other groups has remained bogged down by national opposi-
tion to the encroachment of EU law into sensitive national prerogatives. Para-
doxically, this apparent policy failure to bear normative, cognitive or regulatory 
pressure on national decision-makers didn’t prevent the EU from succeeding, at 
least partly, in institutionalising the disabled as a European social group. While 
disability statistics failed to generate beliefs in their capacity to accurately 
measure incapacity and the effects of policy on different forms of social inclu-
sion, the creation and diffusion of a global number relayed by the Commission, 
experts and interest groups instituted a new European social group. Likewise, 
in creating and supporting the creation of European federations of disability 
interest groups acting as officially recognized spokesmen and instituting the 
disabled as a legal category in treaties and directives, the Commission con-
structed an institutionalised category of European disabled persons. Enrolment 
of academics and consultants through targeted research funding and the support 
for a permanent network of European disability experts provided complemen-
tary forms of legitimacy for a European scale of observation and action. The 
Commission therefore appeared to be more successful as an institutional entre-
preneur than as a policy entrepreneur. It managed to durably structure a space 
of European specialists composed of interest group representatives, academics 
and consultants which proved strong enough to resist the abandonment of the 
dominant problem frame, but too weakly connected to national policy spaces, 
and incapable of producing decisive evidence to support policy claims to bring 
about decisive transformations in the design of policy delivery at the national 
level. Can one conclude from the failure to produce output legitimacy in this 
policy field that the European arena of disability policy provides little more 
than a fig leaf of legitimacy for the EU in social policies? 
One can argue that a primary effect of the focus on employment and activa-
tion may have been the exclusion of other possible problem constructions from 
the preoccupations of policy makers. Indeed, using the Labour Force Survey as 
a statistical basis for identifying problems excluded the possibility to produce 
knowledge on a series of issues which were present in 1996 policy documents 
but quickly disappeared: the high number of people with serious impairments 
                                                                                                                                
firm followed Commission priorities and provided expertise on discrimination and human 
rights in Eastern Europe, in particular the Roma minorities, but also on disability and other 
human rights issues in Eastern Europe in the run up to enlargement. 
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who don’t claim disability status, benefits and support; the problem of poverty 
and adequate housing which was accentuated by reductions in benefits in the 
name of fighting “benefit traps”; the prevention of workplace accidents, limit-
ing exposure to dangerous substances or support public health policies seeking 
to reduce debilitating illnesses or accidents. Furthermore, the emphasis on 
employability, activation, and “benefit traps” constructed the disabled as utility 
maximisers and policy as a tool to “help people make the right choices” (Inter-
view civil servant, DG Empl, December 12, 2008). The universal and abstract 
“unit” of the more or less employable (or disabled) individual overshadowed 
other sociological characteristics of this population such as the strong correla-
tion with age, blue collar professions and low educational attainment. With 
statistical indicators centred on the individual, the actual functioning of labour 
markets have remained largely outside the field of vision and these are all 
issues which an eventual anti-discrimination directive, no matter how ambi-
tious, are unlikely to address, if the predominantly negative effects of the 
Americans with disability act of 1990 on employment levels are any indication 
(Burkhauser and Stapleton 2003).  
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